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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

Noted by Mr. [initials]

No OSD objection to
declassification
subject to [redacted]
[redacted]
concurrence.

25 November 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes from State-JCS Meeting at 11:30 Hours on
21 November 1958

CLASSIFICATION DATA

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CASE NO. <u>89-FoT-2238</u>	
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PRESENT:

General Twining; General Lemnitzer; General LeMay; General Pate; Admiral Russell; Mr. Murphy, with a State Department delegation totalling ten; Mr. Irwin and Lieutenant General Byers from ISA; Lieutenant General Cabell and Mr. Bissell from CIA, and representatives from NSC.

I. Berlin situation presented by Mr. Murphy with Mr. Jerry Smith and Mr. Foy Kohler.

A. Mr. Murphy indicated that the State Department is concerned about the attitude of both East and West Berlin. Until the USSR position with reference to this new situation is disclosed we may not be sure of what they are attempting to accomplish. He stated that he was not as excited about the situation as are many. This is a question of means, tactics and methods. State Department is not thinking of an air lift. There has been no blockade of the civilian population. Apparently this is a [] action is harassing but not to the extent of 1948. While we do not need to resort to the air lift initially, at some point in the future we might have to consider resorting to the air lift.

B. General Twining cautioned that []

[]

C. Mr. Murphy asked what would be our position if []

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D. Mr. Irwin mentioned that this was the first time [] on former occasions they had simply been denied entrance. General Norstad's questions contained in his radiogram covered: []

E. Mr. Murphy agreed that Mr. Irwin's analysis was good. However, he felt the last sentence in the proposed message of the JCS was inadequate. []

[] We should inform USSR in advance of this intention.

F. General Lemnitzer reminded all present that we have []

G. Mr. Murphy acknowledged that [] were to be used, but he felt sure that this was a test of our determination.

H. General Lemnitzer interposed that if the Communist were to []

I. Mr. Murphy explained that in 1948 he felt that if we had []

[] He continued that the State Department had set up an Ad Hoc Group, which included JCS and ISA representatives. The Group would consider this subject at 1300 hours Friday afternoon.

J. General Lemnitzer remarked that the last sentence of the JCS draft might be inadequate but that it was in the right direction.

K. Mr. Irwin expressed a strong view that Secretary McElroy feels the gains we have achieved from our action in Lebanon, Matsu and Quemao must not be lost by weakness in Berlin. He asked what support the U. S. could expect from our U. K. and French Allies. Further, he asked what pressures we were prepared to place on these allies.

L. Mr. Murphy explained that the USSR wants to retrieve something. He expects USSR action. The Ad Hoc Group would present a recommended U. S. position to the President for approval. After

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Presidential approval it is expected that the proposed position would be discussed in Bonn or in Washington with the U. K. and the French.

M. General Lemnitzer explained that until he had heard the remarks just made by Mr. Murphy he had thought the blockade might be equally applicable to civilian travel.

N. Mr. Murphy acknowledged that civilian traffic might be stopped but he felt this would be inconsistent with what he considered to be the Soviet aim. He is of the opinion that they are trying []

[] He said this was always possible but that he doubted the Soviets would relinquish control. He asked if the members of the JCS were agreeable to permitting the Ad Hoc Group to resolve this difficult question. The JCS agreed.

II. U. S. Base Rights in Morocco were discussed by Mr. Murphy, assisted by Mr. Jerry Smith and Mr. Fenfield.

A. General Lemnitzer mentioned that this matter was a speculation that we might lose the U. S. bases.

B. Mr. Murphy commented that it was difficult to contemplate, after the money and resources we had invested in these bases, that we should now be faced with an unfriendly situation brought on by one or two individuals.

C. General Twining remarked that the threat was great and that the [] were very worried. If the United States intends to keep a foothold in Africa we must keep these bases. He continued that many individuals think the bases [] remove the requirement for bases in Morocco. This is not entirely true. We might give up Boukhout but no other.

I. General LeMay agreed that Boukhout has been built as a fighter base and that changes in the employment of fighters removed

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the urgent requirement for this base. He added that the question had to do with more than bases in Morocco and for a period in excess of seven years. Should the Moroccan bases be given up questions might soon be anticipated from [] and others.

D. General Twining added that the Spanish have indicated a large build-up of the Soviet Embassy in Morocco.

E. General LeMay mentioned that this agitation might be to secure the evacuation of the [] The United States must avoid However, a show of determination and a little more help might do the trick so far as Morocco is concerned.

F. Admiral Russell announced that \$463 million had been invested in Morocco. He added that this investment was aiding the American economy.

G. Mr. Murphy added that \$40 million per year is now going into the program. He asked if Lyautey was important.

1. Admiral Russell emphasized that Lyautey was very important as [] and the base for the logistic support for the Mediterranean.

2. Mr. Murphy asked if its []

3. General Twining asked if Mr. Murphy had been able to talk with Ambassador Lodge about this matter to which Mr. Murphy replied in the affirmative.

H. Mr. Murphy returned to the subject of the amount of aid that was contemplated. He said \$45 million and an additional \$10 million had been mentioned. He said that our Ambassador favors additional money.

I. General Lemnitzer asked if this pressure on the Moroccans to cause the U. S. to leave was coming from the Soviet Government.

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M. General LeMay said he was worried about the talk now heard about getting out in two or three years.

1. Admiral Friebel commented that NBC policy mentions a seven year period.

2. Mr. Murphy asked if this meant we would need the bases for seven years? And wondered why the President was concerned about the specific period of seven years.

3. Mr. Irwin believed that we were seeking the longest term for which we might anticipate a favorable reply. Seven years was simply a delaying number.

N. General Twining added that the [] bases also were of great concern. []

1. Mr. Penfield remarked that the [] have told the Moroccans that they will be out by next spring with a possible exception of Ceuta and Melilla.

III. Soviet reaction to U. S. air operations was discussed by Mr. Murphy.

A. Mr. Murphy remarked that the loss of the C-118 and the C-130 was of concern to the State Department. The Soviet action in the Baltic and in the sea of Japan seem to be a part of a definite Soviet pattern. He wondered what the JCS thought about the matter and what the State Department might do to show the Communists the error of their way. He wanted to know if the JCS felt that there was a need on the part of the State Department to do something.

B. General Twining mentioned that we are flying many missions in many areas. To date we have lost twelve planes. Nevertheless, we must make these flights. It was true that a couple of the earlier flights probably were faulty. We must demonstrate our right to fly over international waters.

C. General LeMay commented that we had been making these flights for a long time and that the Russians have known that we

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are. He mentioned that []
a penetration but the []
to avoid future areas of doubt.

[] may not have been
[] are working in close coordination

D. Mr. Murphy called attention to the belligerent tone of Khrushchev's remark that "we will continue to shoot down planes near our frontiers."

E. General Cabell said that the [] flight didn't trigger off Russian reaction because the flight had not been a penetration.

F. Mr. Murphy asked if it was true that the C-47 tail gunner had been unable to return fire.

1. General LeMay assured all that the tail gunner was authorized to return fire. Apparently he had had some difficulty in this instance. He added that our offensive capability is getting weaker with respect to that of the Russians and concluded with the statement that if we eliminate the []
the defense bill goes up.] ~~Stu~~

2. Mr. Murphy hastened to assure all that the State Department wasn't questioning the action. What State Department is seeking is to ascertain those areas in which it may help.

3. General LeMay mentioned that the U. S. may have to treat the Communists as []

G. Mr. Murphy asked what were the U. S. orders in such cases.

1. General LeMay said the orders are []

2. Mr. Murphy asked if these orders applied every-
where.

3. General LeMay replied in the affirmative.

4. Mr. Murphy asked since the plane was sixty-six miles from Soviet territory in the Baltic if there had been any need for

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1. Mr. Murphy admitted that the Istiqlal Party may be pressured by the Soviet. Also there are violent broadcasts from Cairo.

J. General Lemnitzer stated that this was a part of a world wide effort by the Soviet to cause the U. S. trouble. It was being applied in Japan as well as here.

1. Mr. Murphy asked how we approached the Soviet Government on this world wide question.

2. Mr. Fenfield stated that there were pressures within the Moroccan Government, that the King's speech had been significant because it was that of a friend demonstrating moderating influence. Nevertheless, the King is committed to ultimate evacuation. Granted that the Soviet is pressing the Moroccans, how can we meet this?

K. Mr. Murphy opined that we may expect more formal requests for evacuation sooner or later. The State Department people feel we should not talk tough. He asked if consideration of Status of Forces was pertinent to today's discussion.

L. Mr. Irwin interjected that the Status of Forces, while important, was overshadowed at this time by the basic problem of being able to remain in Morocco. He asked for information with respect to the status of the \$45 million aid.

1. A State Department representative commented that the Ambassador is authorized to offer \$40 million.

2. Mr. Irwin said that this authority had been given without DOD concurrence.

3. The State Department member corrected himself to the effect that the money had not yet been offered.

4. Mr. Murphy promised that a hard look would be taken at this question immediately. He asked if this subject could be reopened next week. All agreed.

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radio silence. He was told there had been no such need.

H. Mr. Murphy mentioned that Mr. Kohler had raised the question of buzzing Soviet trawlers.

I. Admiral Russell explained that the Russians were maintaining a dozen trawlers in sterile fishing waters. The question was whether or not these trawlers actually were submarine tenders or were they there for intelligence with respect to shipping.

J. Mr. Murphy asked if retaliation against the submarines reported off Canaveral would help bring the Russians to time.

L. Admiral Russell remonstrated that the United States had always maintained the position that freedom of the seas must be assured all peaceful users.

J. Mr. Murphy expressed concern of the State Department about such interceptions and wondered if it was a part of a big program.

K. General Twining and General LeMay assured all that the Air Force is not concerned at the present time.

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Clevis E. Byers
Lieutenant Colonel, USA
Wing Commander, USAF